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427 
COMMENT 
LYON‟S ROAR, THEN A WHIMPER: 
THE DEMISE OF BROAD ARRANGER 
LIABILITY IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
AFTER THE SUPREME COURT‟S 
DECISION IN BURLINGTON NORTHERN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)
1
 imposes liability on different classes 
of persons for costs incurred responding to the release, or threat of 
release, of hazardous substances.
2
 Included within this spectrum of liable 
parties are persons that contract or “otherwise arrange” for disposal or 
treatment of hazardous substances.
3
 Under this definition of liability, 
persons become liable as “arrangers” for making arrangements to dispose 
of hazardous waste; this is commonly referred to as “arranger liability.”4 
The United States Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington Northern 
& Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States
5
 limits an expansive 
interpretation of CERCLA arranger liability found in the jurisprudence 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
6
 The Supreme Court‟s 
 
 
1
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq. (Westlaw 2010). 
 
2
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1)-(4); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21) (“The term „person‟ means an 
individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, 
United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any 
interstate body.”). 
 
3
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3). 
 
4
 See, e.g., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 696 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
 
5
 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009). 
 
6
 Burlington Northern also considered the question of apportionment and the application of 
1
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decision rejected a foreseeability test proffered by Ninth Circuit to define 
a class of “broader” arranger liability7 and instead required a finding of a 
party‟s “intent to dispose” to impose arranger liability.8 The Supreme 
Court‟s decision also has the effect of strengthening the “useful product 
doctrine,” a doctrine holding that a product manufacturer may not be 
held liable under CERCLA for the sale of a useful product later disposed 
of.
9
 The useful-product doctrine has been narrowly applied by the Ninth 
Circuit.
10
 
The consequence of the Supreme Court‟s holding in Burlington 
Northern is a collective sigh of relief from products manufacturers that 
would have otherwise been subjected to the broad theory of arranger 
liability as spelled out by the Ninth Circuit.
11
 A string of decisions 
throughout the Ninth Circuit, climaxing with the Eastern District of 
California‟s decision in United States v. Lyon,12 had made it increasingly 
more plausible for manufacturers to be named in CERCLA contribution 
actions for simply selling a product that was later found to have been 
released from a site.
13
 The Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington 
Northern all but eliminates the possibility of attaching CERCLA liability 
to product manufacturers that have done nothing more than sell a product 
that was eventually disposed of.
14
 
This Comment will examine the development of arranger liability 
under Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, specifically looking at the impact of 
Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Burlington Northern15 and the impact of the 
Supreme Court‟s reversal. Section II of this Comment will briefly 
examine the mechanisms for triggering CERCLA liability, specifically 
the definition of arranger liability under CERCLA. Next, Section III will 
 
joint and several liability. Id. at 1877. This Comment does not consider the Court‟s analysis of 
apportionment of liability. 
 
7
 United States v. Burlington No. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948-50 (9th Cir. 2008), 
rev’d by Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 
(2009). 
 
8
 Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880. 
 
9
 See id. at 1878 (“It is . . . clear that an entity could not be held liable as an arranger merely 
for selling a new and useful product if the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst to the 
seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to contamination.”). 
 
10
 See Burlington N, 520 F.3d at 949-50. 
 
11
 See United. States v. Lyon, No.N. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329 
(E.D. Cal. 2007). 
 
12
 Id. 
 
13
 See City of Merced v. R.A. Fields, 997 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Cal. Dep‟t of 
Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2005); United States 
v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co, 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 
14
 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878-79 (2009). 
 
15
 Burlington N., 520 F.3d 918. 
2
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address arranger liability in the Ninth Circuit. Specifically, this 
discussion will consider “direct” arranger liability considered in Cadillac 
Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States,
16
 which examined when 
transactions constitute “arrangements for disposal,”17 as contrasted with 
Burlington Northern, which expanded and applied a category of broader 
arranger liability to a supplier of chemical products to a site.
18
 That 
section will also consider United States v. Lyon,
19
 which utilized the 
Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Burlington Northern to cast an even wider net 
of CERCLA liability over manufacturers and suppliers of products that 
had no role in, or a limited role in, the disposal process.
20
 
Section IV of this Comment will review the Supreme Court‟s 
decision in Burlington Northern v. United States.
21
 The Supreme Court 
rejected the foreseeability standard proffered by the Ninth Circuit in 
favor of an “intent to dispose” standard for arranger liability under 
CERCLA.
22
 Section V examines the significance of the Supreme Court‟s 
decision for future Ninth Circuit cases in addition to providing a 
snapshot of liability avoided for products manufacturers in the context of 
dry-cleaning litigation. Finally, this Comment concludes by suggesting 
that the Ninth Circuit is basically back where it started with a standard 
similar to the one announced in Cadillac Fairview. 
II. AN OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION TO CERCLA AND ARRANGER 
LIABILITY 
CERCLA was enacted by Congress in 1980 in response to the 
serious environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.
23
 As 
originally envisioned, CERCLA provided both a funding mechanism for 
the U.S. government to undertake response activities at the nation‟s most 
polluted sites and a strict liability scheme to pursue potentially 
 
 
16
 Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc., v. United States, 41 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 17  Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 565. 
 
18
 Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 807-11. 
 
19
 United States v. Lyon, N. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329 (E.D. 
Cal.2007). 
 
20
 Id. at *7-17. 
 
21
 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009). 
 
22
 Id. at 1880. 
 
23
 See id. at 1874 (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 53 (1998)).  The statute 
gives broad powers to the President to command government agencies and private parties to clean up 
hazardous waste sites. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 53 (1998); see also Exxon Corp v. 
Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 358-59 (1986) (CERCLA was enacted, in part, in response to concerns that 
leaks of hazardous chemicals from disposal sites presented a great risk to the public). 
3
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responsible parties (PRPs) that polluted sites.
24
 CERCLA also 
established the framework for private parties to pursue recovery actions 
for costs incurred responding to pollution.
25
 The liability scheme under 
CERCLA has often been described as a “polluter pays” system, with the 
ultimate responsibility for the cleanup of hazardous waste on “those 
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison.”26 
The Ninth Circuit has described CERCLA as imposing strict liability for 
the release of hazardous substances at a given site.
27
 Liability under 
CERCLA is joint and several,
28
 is retroactive,
29
 and includes past and 
future costs incurred and to be incurred in responding to the effects of 
pollution.
30
 
Liability under CERCLA is triggered, in large part, by a “release” 
of “hazardous substances.”31 Both terms are defined broadly under the 
Act.
32
 A “release” includes, but is not limited to, leaking, spilling, 
 
 
24
 See Martina E. Cartwright, Superfund: It’s No Longer Super and It Isn’t Much of a Fund, 
18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 305-14 (2005). CERCLA, originally provided two funding mechanisms 
that allowed the government to respond to the threats posed by environmental waste sites. Id. at 305-
06. The first funding mechanism was a strict-liability scheme that made polluters responsible for 
costs incurred by the government to respond to a release or threat of release of a hazardous 
substance. Id. The second CERCLA funding mechanism was the “Superfund,” a trust that was 
created by taxing the petrochemical industry; the trust provided monies for the USEPA to take 
emergency measures without first establishing a polluter‟s liability. Id. at 308.  CERCLA‟s original 
taxing authority, meant to feed the Superfund trust, expired on September 30, 1985. Id. at 312. The 
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 extended the Superfund taxing authority 
through December 31, 1995. Id. at 3143. 
 
25
 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f)(1) (Westlaw 2010) (establishing a right of contribution against 
a liable party, as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), during or following an action by the United States 
under 42 U.S.C. § 9606 or  another party under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B) 
allowing recovery of response costs incurred from liable parties). For a discussion of how these two 
different sections work, see United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 131-33 (2002). Both 
sections require that the recovery being sought is from one of the liable parties defined at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a). See id. at 131-2. 
 
26
 Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2s2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 
1986). This familiar quote has shown up in multiple opinions, in multiple circuits, aptly describing 
the purpose of CERCLA‟s liability scheme. See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co.Allis Chalmers Corp., 
893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 
1377 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 
27
 U.S. v. Burlington No.N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 
28
 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct.1870, 1881 (2009)) 
(“[A]lthough [CERCLA] imposed a „strict liability standard,‟ it did not mandate „joint and several‟ 
liability in every case.” (citation omitted) (quoting the “seminal opinion” in United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805, 807 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (Rubin, C.J.)). 
 
29
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2) (Westlaw 2010). Liability may attach to a past owner of 
property, if releases occurred in the past. Id. 
 
30
 See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1878. 
 
31
 61C AM. JUR. 2D Pollution Control § 1271 (2009). 
 
32
 Id. 
4
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dumping, discharging and pumping.
33
 The term “hazardous substances” 
encompasses a wide potpourri of chemicals, including those substances 
defined under similar statutes such as the Solid Waste Disposal Act, the 
Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act.
 34
 “Hazardous substances” do 
not include, generally, petroleum products that are not otherwise listed or 
designated as hazardous substances.
35
 Last, liability under CERLA 
requires that the hazardous substance be released from a “facility.”36 A 
“facility” is another broadly defined term describing areas for storage, 
handing or disposal of hazardous substances.
37
 Consequently, CERLCA 
liability is triggered when a hazardous substance is released from a 
facility.  Based on the comprehensive language of the statutes, most 
cases of pollution easily meet these three requirements, with liability 
ultimately hinging on whether a party is one of a group of liable parties.
38
 
CERCLA liability may attach to persons generally described as any 
of the following: (1) the present owner and operator of a facility;
39
 (2) the 
past owner and operator of a facility, during the time when hazardous 
 
 
33
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(22) (Westlaw 2010) (“release” means any spilling, leaking, pumping, 
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into 
the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed 
receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant)). 
 
34
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (“The term „hazardous substance‟ means (A) any substance 
designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, 
solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste 
having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921] (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) 
any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed 
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous 
chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to 
section 2606 of Title 15.”). 
 
35
 Id. (“The term [„hazardous substance‟] does not include petroleum, including crude oil or 
any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance 
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, 
natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas 
and such synthetic gas).”). 
 
36
 42 U.S.C.A. at §§ 9601(a), 9607(a)(1)-(4); see also Tommy Tucker Henson, What a Long, 
Strange Trip It’s Been: Broader Arranger Liability in the Ninth Circuit and Rethinking the Useful 
Product Doctrine, 38 ENVTL. L. 941, 944-45 (Summer 2008). 
 
37
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9) (“The term „facility‟ means (A) any building, structure, installation, 
equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), 
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, 
or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed 
of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in 
consumer use or any vessel.”); see also Henson, supra note 36, at 945. 
 38 Henson, supra note 36, at 945. 
 
39
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) (Westlaw 2010). 
5
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substances were disposed of at the facility;
40
  
[(3)] any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged 
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport 
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed 
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or 
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and 
containing such hazardous substances[;]
41
 
and (4) any transporter of  hazardous substances to a facility.
42
 
Accordingly, the United States may bring a CERCLA action to recover 
costs incurred cleaning up a hazardous waste site against an owner of a 
facility from which there had been a release of hazardous substances.
43
 
A prima facie case for contribution between liable persons requires a 
showing that a chemical was a hazardous substance, there was a release 
of the substance from a facility, the release caused the claimant to incur 
response costs, and the defendant is one of the four classes of liable 
persons under CERCLA.
44
 
Interpreting the third class of liable parties, “arrangers” under 
CERCLA, is difficult due to the fact that the operative language is not 
defined in the Act.
45
 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) defines an arranger as “any 
person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or 
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or 
treatment, of hazardous substances . . . .”46 The section defines both 
“disposal” and “hazardous substances,”47 but it fails to give meaning to 
 
 
40
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2).(Westlaw 2010). 
 
41
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3). 
 
42
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4). 
 
43
 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55-57 (1998) (describing, generally, the 
mechanism for recovering response costs under CERCLA). 
 
44
 See Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 
1076 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 
 
45
 Jeffrey Gaba, Interpreting Section 107(A)(3) of CERCLA: When Has a Person “Arranged 
for Disposal?”, 44 Sw. L.J. 1313, 1317-18 (1991) (“At a minimum, section 107(a)(3) imposes 
liability on generators who send waste off-site for disposal. . . . More difficult questions about the 
scope of section 107(a)(3) arise when the transaction has characteristics of a sale of a product.”). 
 
46
 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
47
 “Disposal” is defined at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(29) (Westlaw 2010). The terms “disposal,” 
“hazardous waste,” and “treatment” have the meaning provided in section 1004 of the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act. Id. Under the Solid Waste Disposal Act “disposal” means “the discharge, deposit, 
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any 
land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the 
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.” 42 
U.S.C.A. § 6903(3) (Westlaw 2010). “Hazardous substances” is defined in 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14). 
6
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the phrase “otherwise arranged for.”48 A plain reading of the statute 
requires that liability be attached to a party that enters into a transaction 
whose purpose is the disposal of a hazardous substance.
49
 Legislative 
analysis, in an attempt to bring meaning to CERCLA, does not generally 
bear fruit.
50
 
Parties covered under such an interpretation of § 9607(a)(3) may 
include generators of waste that contract for waste hauling services in 
addition to parties that serve a broker function, i.e., not owning the waste 
but controlling its ultimate disposition.
51
 What unifies this liability 
scheme is that the central purpose of the transaction involves an 
arrangement for the disposal of waste.
52
 These cases are commonly 
known as “direct” arranger liability cases.53 The application of § 
9607(a)(3) becomes more complex when the transaction or arrangement 
for disposal more closely resembles the sale of a product.
54
 In the Ninth 
Circuit, these latter arranger liability cases have come to be known as 
broader arranger liability cases.
55
 
A common defense to the allegation of arranger liability is the 
useful-product doctrine.
56
 The useful-product doctrine recognizes that the 
sale of a hazardous substance, when marketed as a useful product
57
 that 
 
 
48
 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1879 (2009) 
(“Because CERCLA does not specifically define what it means to „arrang[e] for‟ disposal of a 
hazardous substance, we give the phrase its ordinary meaning. In common parlance, the word 
„arrange‟ implies action directed to a specific purpose. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 
64 (10th ed.1993) (defining „arrange‟ as „to make preparations for: plan[;] ... . . to bring about an 
agreement or understanding concerning‟); see also Amcast Indus. Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 
1993) (words “„arranged for‟ . . .  impl[ies] intentional action”). Consequently, under the plain 
language of the statute, an entity may qualify as an arranger under § 9607(a)(3) when it takes 
intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.” (some internal citations omitted)). 
 
49
 Gaba, supra note 45, at 1318. 
 
50
 TOD I. ZUCKERMAN, THOMAS J. BOIS II & THOMAS M. JOHNSON, ENVTL. LIABILITY 
ALLOCATION L. & PRAC. § 3:3 (2009) (discussing in part, the hurried legislative history of CERCLA 
limiting debate on statutory language and limited committee reports that confound attempts at 
understanding legislative intent). The Supreme Court has had occasion to observe that certain 
sections of CERCLA “[are] not a model of legislative draftsmanship.” Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 
U.S. 355, 363 (1986). But see Gaba, supra note 45, at 1327. Professor Gaba argues that the sparse 
legislative history supports a conclusion that CERCLA‟s purpose was to impose liability on 
generators of waste. Id. at 1327. Arranger liability was intended to serve as a check on waste 
disposal practices of generators. Id. 
 
51
 See Gaba, supra note 45, at 1318. 
 
52
 Id. 
 
53
 Henson, supra note 36, at 945. 
 
54
 See Gaba, supra note 45, at 1318-19. 
 
55
 See U.S. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 
56
 See, e.g., id. at 949-50. 
 
57
 The definition of a “useful-product” in and of itself is often disputed, as plaintiffs and 
defendants attempt to distinguish between primary products and secondary products or byproducts 
7
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is later disposed of, is not an arrangement for disposal as envisioned by 
CERCLA.
58
 While there is no per-se rule that any sale of a “useful 
product” escapes CERCLA liability, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly 
stated that when a manufacturer does nothing more than sell a product to 
an end user, the manufacturer has not incurred liability for the 
generation, transportation, or arrangement for the disposal of waste.
59
 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF ARRANGER LIABILITY IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
The Ninth Circuit has given significant treatment to the question of 
what constitutes arranger liability and has likely expanded the reach of 
arranger liability further than any other circuit.
60
 “Direct” or “traditional” 
arranger liability under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) contemplates CERCLA 
liability attaching to a party involved in a transaction wherein the “sole 
purpose of the transaction is to arrange for the treatment or disposal of 
hazardous wastes.”61 However, this is not to say that the question of the 
purpose of a transaction cannot be disputed.
62
 Thus the central inquiry in 
the application of arranger liability goes beyond the parties‟ own 
characterization of the transaction to determine if there was an 
arrangement for disposal.
63
 
The Ninth Circuit also recognizes a broader arranger liability where 
the disposal may be contemplated by the transaction but is not the 
primary focus of the transaction, i.e., the arranger “is either the source of 
the pollution or manages its disposal.”64 The Ninth Circuit‟s 
interpretation of arranger liability hit its apex in Burlington Northern.
65
 
 
that may have market value. See Henson, supra note 35, at 36, at 944-45.  This distinction and which 
type of product rightfully triggers the useful-product doctrine are beyond the scope of this Comment 
and were not at issue in the Burlington Northern matter. 
 
58
 See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1994); see 
also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(rejecting a theory of arranger liability based on a transaction where the defendant sold transformers 
containing PCBs to the plaintiff; the plaintiff was liable for response costs arising out of PCB 
contamination). 
 
59
 See, e.g., Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 508 F.3d 930, 934 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
 
60
 See Henson, supra note 36, at 946-48 (summarizing recent 9th Circuit case law regarding 
broader arranger liability). 
 
61
 United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 
62
 See, e.g., Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 752 (9th Cir. 1994) (disputing 
the characterization of the sale of used battery casings as an arrangement for transporting or 
disposing of wastes); Cadillac Fairview/Cal./California, Inc. v. United. States, 41 F.3d 562, 566 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (described infra notes 73-and 83 and accompanying text). 
 
63
 See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc., v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
64
 United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 
65
 Henson, supra note 36, at 943 (Burlington Northern constituted the “most expansive scope 
8
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Examining factors such as ownership, control, and the role of the useful-
product doctrine, the court suggested that liability should be imposed 
when disposal is a foreseeable byproduct of any transaction.
66
 The 
impact of the Ninth Circuit‟s holding was immediately seen in United 
States v. Lyon.
67
 In Lyon, The District Court for the Northern District of 
California relied on the analysis provided by the Ninth Circuit in 
Burlington Northern to suggest that defendants that only supplied new 
products or equipment to a facility from which there had been a release 
were now covered by CERCLA under the guise of arranger liability.
68
 
A. DIRECT ARRANGER LIABILITY: CADILLAC FAIRVIEW/CALIFORNIA V. 
UNITED STATES
69
 
Direct arranger liability will be found when the removal and release 
of hazardous substances is not only the consequence but the very purpose 
of a transaction.
70
 Factors such as control of the waste disposal process or 
ownership of the hazardous substance may be informative of arranger 
liability, but ultimately they are not requirements.
71
 Thus a court will 
look to the substance of the transaction to determine if a finder of fact 
could infer that what the parties contemplated was an arrangement for 
the disposal of waste.
72
 
Prior to Burlington Northern, the Ninth Circuit decided Cadillac 
Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States.
73
 In that case, the court 
examined a series of transactions between Dow Chemical (Dow) and 
several rubber companies, finding that a party may be liable under § 
9607(a)(3) without owning the hazardous substance or controlling the 
disposal process.
74
 In Cadillac Fairview, the plaintiff brought suit under 
CERCLA against Dow, several rubber companies, and the government 
 
[of liability] accepted by any federal court of appeals.”). 
 
66
 Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 948-49. 
 
67
 United States v. Lyon, N. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329. 
 
68
 Id. at *7-19. 
 
69
 Cadillac Fairview/Cal./California, Inc., v. United .States, 41 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
70
 See Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 565 (“the question is whether the fact-finder could infer 
from all the circumstances that a transaction in fact involves an arrangement for the disposal [or 
treatment] of a hazardous substance. The record before the district court was sufficient to support a 
finding that the rubber companies arranged to transfer contaminated styrene to Dow for completion 
of the re-distillation process that led to the release of the hazardous substances.”) (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted). 
 
71
 See id. 
 
72
 See id. 
 
73
 Id. 
 
74
 Id. at 565-66. 
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for costs incurred removing styrene and other hazardous chemicals from 
the plaintiff‟s property.75 Dow and the rubber companies had produced 
synthetic rubber at the site in question under contract with the U.S. 
government during World War II.
76
 Dow “sold” styrene to the rubber 
companies to process into synthetic rubber.
77
 Dow then bought back, at a 
reduced price, approximately 30-40% of the styrene that had become 
contaminated during the manufacturing process and could not be 
converted to rubber.
78
 Dow then distilled the contaminated styrene to 
remove the contaminants.
79
 The distilled, “recycled,” styrene was then 
sold back to the rubber companies, and the residual contaminants from 
the distillation process were disposed of in pits near Dow‟s plant.80 After 
the war effort was over, the government sold the property, which 
ultimately ended up with the plaintiff, Cadillac Fairview.
81
 
Dow filed cross-claims for contribution, alleging that the rubber 
companies were liable as arrangers under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) for 
sending the contaminated styrene back to Dow for treatment.
82
 In 
response, the rubber companies argued that they could not be arrangers 
because they did not own or control the disposal process that resulted in 
the release of hazardous substances.
83
 In prior Ninth Circuit cases 
addressing arranger liability, ownership and control had been factors 
indicative of arranger liability.
84
 
The court disposed of the rubber companies‟ arguments, holding 
that neither the language of the statute or cases interpreting it had limited 
the application of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) to require that a responsible 
party own the hazardous substance or control the process that resulted in 
the release of contaminants.
85
 The determinative inquiry, the court stated, 
was the one first proffered in Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & 
 
 
75
 Id. at 564. 
 
76
 Id. The contract required that the companies would construct, lease, and operate a 
government-owned facility on land owned by the government. Id. at 563. 
 
77
 Id. The styrene and raw materials used by Dow and the rubber companies were actually 
owned by the United States government, reimbursing the companies for the costs incurred and 
paying the companies a fee to operate the various facilities. Id. at 563. 
 
78
 Id. at 564. 
 
79
 Id. 
 
80
 Id. 
 
81
 Id. 
 
82
 Id. at 564-65. 
 
83
 Id. at 565. 
 
84
 See Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 752 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Jones-
Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992) for the proposition 
that ownership or control of hazardous substances serves as evidence of arranging for disposal). 
 
85
 Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1994). 
10
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Services, Inc.:
86
 “whether the fact-finder could infer from all the 
circumstances that a transaction in fact involves an arrangement for the 
disposal or treatment of hazardous substance.”87 The Ninth Circuit stated 
that the “[r]emoval and release of the hazardous substances was not only 
the inevitable consequence, but the very purpose of the return of the 
contaminated styrene to Dow.”88 On this basis the court found the rubber 
companies could be liable as arrangers under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
89
 
The court also addressed the useful-product doctrine.  The rubber 
companies argued that the transaction was one that involved the sale of a 
useful product, not an arrangement for disposal, thus invoking the useful-
product doctrine.
90
 The court stated that it does not necessarily matter 
how the transaction is cast; characterization of a transaction as a “sale” 
does not immunize the transaction from the reach of statute.
91
 
The importance of Cadillac Fairview is the court‟s acknowledgment 
of factors considered to be determinative of arranger liability and 
rejection of these touchstones as per-se requirements under CERCLA.
92
 
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit considered control of the process that led 
to a release of hazardous substances, and ownership of the substances 
released.
93
 Removing per-se requirements of “ownership” or “control” 
would become central themes in expanding arranger liability.
94
 The 
finding of arranger liability will be based on an inquiry of all facts and 
 
 
86
 Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Services., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 694-95 (9th Cir. 
1992). Jones-Hamilton was the first case by the Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit to consider the 
issue of arranger liability, adopting the test proffered by the Eighth Circuit in United. States. v. Aceto 
Agrrgic. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). Id. at 695.  Ironically, the application of 
arranger liability in Jones-Hamilton, may be considered a “broader arranger” liability case under the 
term coined by the Ninth Circuit in later cases. 
 
87
 Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 565 (quoting Jones-Hamilton v. Beazer Materials and & 
Services., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1992)) (citations omitted). 
 
88
 Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 566. 
 
89
 Id. 
 
90
 Id. at 566. 
 
91
 Id. 
 
92
 See id. at 565. 
 
93
 Id. 
 
94
 See id. In later cases, the Ninth Circuit would reiterate the point that ownership or control 
were not prerequisites to finding arranger liability, but factors to be considered. See United States v. 
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We believe requiring proof of personal 
ownership or actual physical possession of hazardous substances as a precondition for [arranger] 
liability . . . would be inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of CERCLA.” (quoting United 
States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Burlington 
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 951 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating, “[n]one of these cases, however, 
indicates that ownership or control at the time of transfer are the sine qua non of nontraditional 
arranger liability”). 
11
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circumstances to determine the intent of the parties.
95
 
B. BROAD ARRANGER LIABILITY: UNITED STATES V. BURLINGTON 
NORTHERN & SANTA FE RAILWAY CO.
96
 
Cadillac Fairview addressed the concept of “direct” or “traditional” 
arranger liability.
97
 The concept and application of a broader arranger 
liability, however, was fully realized in the Ninth Circuit‟s decision in 
United States v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
98
 In Burlington 
Northern, the Ninth Circuit expanded arranger liability to cover 
situations where disposal of waste is not the sole purpose of the 
arrangement but a foreseeable byproduct of the transaction.
99
 Defining 
this class of broader arranger liability, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
factors such as control and ownership will largely influence the 
determination of broader arranger liability but are not dispositive of the 
liability outcome.
100
 Further, the Ninth Circuit‟s opinion in Burlington 
Northern adopted a very narrow application of the useful-product 
doctrine, significantly limiting its immunizing effect.
101
 
Brown and Bryant (B&B) was an agricultural chemical and storage 
and distribution company, operating in Arvin, California.
102
 Included in 
B&B‟s operations were the purchase, receipt, and storage of two 
agricultural chemicals, including a chemical called D-D, produced by 
Shell Oil Company (Shell).
103
 During the 1960s and 1970s, Shell 
encouraged its customers, including B&B, to purchase D-D in bulk.
104
 
Shell delivered the D-D, FOB destination via a common carrier, meaning 
that Shell delivered the chemical at its own risk and expense until 
 
 
95
 See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
96
 United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 
129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009). 
 
97
 Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 565; see also Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 948. 
 
98
 Id. Burlington Northern is the first Ninth Circuit case to provide a robust discussion and 
find broad arranger liability.  Broad arranger liability had been previously considered in United 
States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002), but not applied. In fact the first broader 
arranger liability case was likely Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Services., Inc., 973 F.2d 
688 (9th Cir. 1992), which discussed a transaction that fits the description of broader arranger 
liability found in Burlington Northern. 
 
99
 Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 948-49, 952. 
 
100
 Id. at 951. 
 
101
 See id. at 949-50. 
 
102
 Id. at 930. 
 
103
 Id. at 930-31. D-D is an agricultural chemical, specifically a soil fumigant that is designed 
to kill nematodes and microscopic worms that attack the roots of crops. Id. at 931. 
 
104
 Id. 
12
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accepted by B&B.
105
 Trucks delivered the D-D to B&B‟s large storage 
tanks by hoses: “[t]he process was quite messy, with frequent spills” of 
D-D.
106
 B&B‟s own storage practices also resulted in releases from 
storage tanks, in part a result of the corrosive nature of D-D.
107
 
In 1983, the California Department of Toxic Substance Control 
(DTSC) investigated the site and discovered that B&B was in violation 
of numerous hazardous waste laws; a separate United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigation confirmed 
substantial soil and groundwater contamination at the Arvin facility.
108
 
Both EPA and DTSC undertook remedial actions at the Arvin site.
109
 In 
1996 EPA and DTSC filed actions against PRPs, including B&B and 
Shell, for reimbursement of response costs incurred investigating and 
remediating contamination at the site.
110
 The district court found Shell 
liable as a person that arranged for disposal of hazardous substances 
under § 9607(a)(3).
111
 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit distinguished direct arranger liability, 
as discussed in Cadillac Fairview, from the category of broader arranger 
liability first recognized in United States v. Shell Oil.
112
 The court stated 
that in broader arranger liability, the transaction between the parties 
contemplates “disposal as a part of, but not the focus of, the transaction; 
the „arranger‟ is either the source of the pollution or manages its 
disposal.”113 The court further described broader arranger liability as 
resulting from transactions where the arranger did not contract directly 
for the disposal of hazardous substances but in which disposal was a 
foreseeable byproduct of the transaction.
114
 
The court also instructed that disposal need not have been 
purposeful to warrant the imposition of liability in a broader arranger 
 
 
105
 Id. 
 
106
 Id. 
 
107
 Id. 
 
108
 Id. at 931. 
 
109
 Id. 
 
110
 Id. at 932. 
 
111
 Id. 
 
112
 See United. States. v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002). Shell appears to be the 
first Ninth Circuit case to apply the nomenclature of “broader” arranger liability, while Burlington 
Northern, appears to be the first Ninth Circuit case to use the terminology and give considerable 
discussion to the distinction between the two before finding liability under a broad arranger theory of 
liability. Ironically, the concept of a broader arranger liability was introduced in Shell, by a group of 
oil companies including Shell. Id. at 1055. 
 
113
 United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(citing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F. 3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002)), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1870 
(2009) (emphasis in original). 
 
114
 Id. at 948-49. 
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liability context.
115
 The court stated that because the definition of 
“disposal” under CERCLA includes unintentional actions such as 
leaking, the disposal by the arranger did not need to be intentional.
116
 The 
court concluded that arranger liability could be found even when the 
transaction resulted in a “disposal” that was a result of leakage or other 
unintentional or non-purposeful conduct.
117
 
The court in Cadillac Fairview held that the central query was 
whether the transaction in fact constituted an arrangement for disposal.
118
 
In finding liability, the court described a transaction where the purpose 
and inevitable consequence of the transaction was disposal.
119
 Burlington 
Northern held that this inquiry could be expanded.
120
 The Ninth Circuit 
was no longer solely considering the intent of the transaction, as 
instructed by Cadillac Fairview  ¸ but was assessing liability where the 
transaction had the secondary effect of disposal or even an unintentional 
element of disposal.
121
The court justified the expansion as being in line 
with the larger remedial goals of CERCLA.
122
 
The Ninth Circuit also addressed issues of ownership and control as 
the guideposts for analyzing arranger liability.
123
 While noting that there 
is no statutory requirement of control as a requisite to the imposition of 
liability, the court stated, “we have tended to view control as a „crucial 
element‟ in determining whether the party arranged for disposal.”124 The 
court added that it viewed “ownership of hazardous substances at the 
time of disposal as an important factor in nontraditional, indirect arranger 
 
 
115
 Id. at 948-49. 
 
116
 Id. at 949. 
 
117
 Id. The issue of intentional versus “non-purposeful” disposal in the context of arranger 
liability is also an important point of departure between the various circuits. See David W. Lannetti, 
Note, “Arranger Liability” Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA): Judicial Retreat from Legislative Intent, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 279, 
291-312 (1998). 
 
118
 Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
119
 Id. at 566. 
 
120
 See United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 949 (9th Cir. 2008), 
rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (“an entity can be an arranger even if it did not intend to dispose of the 
product. Arranging for a transaction in which there necessarily would be leakage or some other form 
of disposal of hazardous substances is sufficient.”). 
 
121
 Id. at 949. 
 
122
 See id. at 948 (“We have avoided giving the term „arranger‟ too narrow an interpretation to 
avoid frustrating CERCLA's goal of requiring that companies responsible for the introduction of 
hazardous waste into the environment pay for remediation. Accordingly, we have recognized, in 
addition to „direct‟ arranger liability, a „broader‟ category of arranger liability in which disposal of 
hazardous wastes is a foreseeable byproduct of, but not the purpose of, the transaction giving rise to 
PRP status.”) (citations omitted). 
 
123
 See id. at 950-51. 
 
124
 Id. at 951 (citing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
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liability cases.”125 Neither factor creates a per-se rule for finding or 
dismissing broader arranger liability, but instead constitutes “useful 
indices or clues toward the end of „looking beyond defendants‟ 
characterizations to determine whether a transaction in fact involves an 
arrangement for the disposal of a hazardous substance.‟”126 The Ninth 
Circuit held that the district court‟s findings demonstrated that Shell had 
sufficient control over, and knowledge of, the transfer process to be 
considered an arranger within the meaning of CERCLA.
127
 
The court also considered the useful-product doctrine as a defense 
raised by Shell.
128
 The court stated that the defense is not available where 
the sale of a useful product “necessarily and immediately results in the 
leakage of hazardous substances.”129 Specifically, the court highlighted 
the fact that D-D can never realize its usefulness to B&B, if it is spilled 
before B&B can use it in agricultural application.
130
 Such an event 
prevents a product from its intended use, thus stripping the product of 
immunity.
131
 The court explained that Shell‟s liability was a not  function 
of the nature of the product, but from the disposal of the product during a 
process orchestrated by Shell; thus liability was derived not from the 
manufacturing of products, but from Shell‟s role in the leakage prior to 
use.
132
 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit did not disavow the useful product 
defense, but clarified that it is intended to apply after a product is used, 
creating a narrow window in which it will be applied. 
In concluding that Shell was liable as an arranger under the broader 
categorization, the Ninth Circuit keyed in on three determinative factors.  
 
 
125
 Id. (citing Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th 
Cir. 1992)). 
 
126
 Id. at 951 (quoting United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373,1381 (8th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 
127
 Id. The Ninth Circuit points to six factors that demonstrate that Shell had sufficient control 
to impose arranger liability: “(1) [s]pills occurred every time the deliveries were made; (2) Shell 
arranged for delivery and chose the common carrier that transported its product to the Arvin site; (3) 
Shell changed its delivery process so as to require the use of large storage tanks, thus necessitating 
the transfer of large quantities of chemicals and causing leakage from corrosion of the large steel 
tanks; (4) Shell provided a rebate for improvements in B & B‟s bulk handling and safety facilities 
and required an inspection by a qualified engineer; (5) Shell regularly would reduce the purchase 
price of the D-D, in an amount the district court concluded was linked to loss from leakage; and (6) 
Shell distributed a manual and created a checklist of the manual requirements, to ensure that D-D 
tanks were being operated in accordance with Shell‟s safety instructions.” Id. at 962 (italics in 
original). 
 
128
 Id. at 949. 
 
129
 Id. at 950. 
 
130
 Id. 
 
131
 Id. 
 
132
 Id. at 950 n.34. 
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First, Shell was not required to have intent to dispose of waste to have 
arranged for disposal under CERCLA.
133
 Disposal for CERCLA 
purposes could be a passive byproduct of a transaction, with liability to 
be imposed where disposal is a foreseeable byproduct of the 
transaction.
134
 Second, as held in Cadillac Fairview, no per-se rule 
regarding ownership or control of the hazardous substance was necessary 
for a finding of arranger liability, but that in a broader arranger liability 
scheme, control becomes central to the query on liability.
135
 Last, 
immunity was not available to Shell under the useful-product doctrine 
because Shell‟s practices prevented the product from being put to its 
intended use.
136
 Shell‟s liability, therefore, resulted from its role in the 
disposal of the product, not the product itself.
137
 
As a result of the Ninth Circuit‟s decision, broader arranger liability 
is more expansive and more amorphous.
138
 The Ninth Circuit‟s approach 
expands the inquiry past the parties‟ intention, prescribed by Cadillac 
Fairview, to find liability where disposal is a foreseeable byproduct of 
the subject transaction.
139
 The Ninth Circuit in Burlington Northern did 
not suggest a concrete set of criteria to establish arranger liability, but 
instead suggested that arranger liability will be a consequence of a fact-
intensive inquiry at the trial level.
140
 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT‟S BURLINGTON NORTHERN DECISION 
APPLIED: UNITED STATES V. LYON
141
  
Within six months after Burlington Northern, the Ninth Circuit‟s 
expanded view of arranger liability reared its head.
142
 In U.S. v. Lyon, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied 
 
 
133
 Id. at 949, 961. 
 
134
 Id. at 948-49. 
 
135
 Id. at 951. 
 
136
 Id. at 950. 
 
137
 See id. 
 
138
 See Henson, supra note 36, at 943. 
 
139
 United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 
140
 Id. at 809. 
 
141
 United States v. Lyon, No. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329 (E.D. 
Cal. 2007). 
 
142
 Lyon was decided after the Ninth Circuit‟s opinion in United States v. Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co, 502 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2007), but before this opinion was superseded by United 
States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co, 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit‟s 
superseding opinion still features the same conclusions and the majority of the analysis as the 
original opinion. Thus, although Lyon cites to the now defunct 2007 Burlington Northern opinion, its 
analysis should still be considered valid. 
16
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a chemical manufacturer‟s motion to dismiss a claim of arranger 
liability.
143
 The manufacturer‟s only connection to the site in question 
had been the sale of new chemical product, through an intermediary, to 
an end user at the site.
144
 Relying chiefly on the third-party plaintiff‟s 
arguments that Burlington Northern had cast a broad net of liability and 
undermined the useful-product doctrine, the Eastern District of 
California held that the issue of the chemical manufacturer‟s liability 
could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.
145
 
The EPA instituted an action against the first-party defendants, 
including Lyon/Tondas (Lyon), the owner of a site where a dry cleaner 
had been located, for past and future response costs arising out of 
groundwater contaminated with percholorethylene (PCE), a solvent used 
in dry-cleaning operations.
146
 Lyon subsequently filed a third-party 
complaint against 22 third-party defendants, including five chlorinated 
solvent manufacturers.
147
 Vulcan Materials Company (Vulcan) was one 
of the five third-party defendant solvent manufacturers.
148
 Lyon‟s third-
party complaint alleged, in part, that the third-party defendants had 
arranged for disposal of hazardous substances at the site.
149
 Lyon did not 
allege that Vulcan sold PCE directly to the dry cleaner at the site, but 
rather that distributors purchased and resold chlorinated solvents to the 
dry cleaner operator.
150
 Further, the Lyon made no allegations that 
Vulcan: “(1) had contact with [the dry cleaner]; (2) was aware of which 
dry cleaners purchased PCE from a solvent distributor; or (3) possessed 
authority or control over subsequent PCE disposal of by [the dry cleaner] 
of PCE in waste form.”151 
Largely based on the Lyon parties‟ interpretation of Burlington 
Northern, the District Court denied Vulcan‟s motion to dismiss on the 
claim of arranger liability.
152
 The district court pointed to the Ninth 
Circuit‟s recognition of a broader category of arranger liability “in which 
disposal of hazardous waste is a foreseeable byproduct of, but not the 
purpose of, the transaction giving rise to PRP . . .  status.”153 Citing the 
 
 
143
 Id. at *25. 
 
144
 Id. at *6. 
 
145
 Id. at *16, 20. 
 
146
 Id. at *4. 
 
147
 Id at *5. 
 
148
 Id. at *4-5. 
 
149
 Id. at *5. 
 
150
 Id. at *6. 
 
151
 Id. at *6. 
 
152
 See id. at *11-16. 
 
153
 Id. at *11 (citing United. States. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 502 F.3d 781, 807 
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Ninth Circuit‟s decision, the district court stated that a transaction that 
necessarily resulted in leakage or some other form of disposal of a 
hazardous substance was sufficient for liability under CERCLA‟s 
statutory scheme.
154
 As the district court conceded, the problem for 
Vulcan was reconciling the standard on a motion to dismiss and the 
theory of broader arranger liability as spelled out in Burlington 
Northern.
155
 In essence, arranger liability is found when parties contract 
to sell hazardous substances that are then disposed of.
156
 
Addressing the useful-product doctrine, the district court concluded 
that the characterization of a transaction as a sale does not immunize the 
transaction from an inquiry as to whether the product is used for its 
intended purpose.
157
 If the product could never be put to its intended use 
because of leakage inherent in the manufacturer‟s transfer and delivery 
process, the useful-product doctrine could not be applied under 
Burlington Northern.
158
 While the Ninth Circuit had refused to hold a 
party liable for merely selling a useful product that was later disposed of, 
in the CERCLA context, “hazardous substances are generally dealt with 
at the point where they are about to, or have become, wastes.”159 In Lyon, 
the defendants argued: 
the useful product doctrine does not apply when chemical leakage is 
inherent and contemporaneous with the manufacturer‟s transfer 
process and the manufacturer has sufficient control over and 
knowledge of the transfer process to be considered a CERCLA 
arranger.
160
 
The questions surrounding Vulcan‟s “disposal,” or the necessary 
 
(9th Cir. 2007), superseded on denial of reh’g en banc, 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. 
Ct. 1870 (2009)). 
 
154
 Id. at *12 (citing United States v. & Santa Fe Ry. Co, 781. 808 (9th Cir. 2007), superseded 
on denial of reh’g en banc, 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009)). 
 
155
 Id. at *16 (“[Third party defendant‟s] alleged disposal or leakage of hazardous materials 
are factual questions not subject to [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6) resolution. At this point, this Court is 
not in a position to determine whether [third-party defendant], as a PCE manufacturer and seller, is a 
disposer or discharger of PCE waste. Although they do not provide a model pleading, the 
Lyon/Tondas allege enough for arranger liability and to avoid the useful product defense.”). 
 
156
 See id. 
 
157
 Id. at *15-6. 
 
158
 Id. at *15; see also U.S. v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co,, 520 F.3d 918, 950 
(9th Cir. 2008) (“The useful product cases have no applicability where, as here, the sale of a useful 
product necessarily and immediately results in the leakage of hazardous substances. In that 
circumstance, the leaked portions of the hazardous substances are never used for their intended 
purpose.”) (emphasis in original). 
 
159
 Lyon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329, at *14 (citation omitted). 
 
160
 Id. at *15. 
18
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol3/iss2/6
06_MAGNUS PRINTER VERSION 5/22/2010  11:57 AM 
2010] DEMISE OF BROAD ARRANGER LIABILITY 445 
inquiry to determine if disposal had taken place, were factual issues that 
could not be resolved on a motion for dismissal.
161
 
Last, the court concluded that, while ownership is not a prerequisite 
to arranger liability, arranger liability based on a theory of ownership 
was satisfied for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Burlington 
Northern by the allegation that Vulcan had sold PCE to the dry cleaner; 
the sales were indicative of Vulcan‟s possession.162 
Lyon’s interpretation of Burlington Northern may have pushed the 
barriers as to what the Ninth Circuit had intended.
163
 Specifically, the 
Lyon decision did not distinguish the role played by Shell in the delivery 
process versus Vulcan‟s rather remote role.164 Vulcan sold to an 
intermediary and had no knowledge of the end user.
165
 Shell maintained 
an ongoing role in refining the bulk transfer process of D-D to B&B.
166
 
Therefore, addressing one of the “useful indices” of broader arranger 
liability, Lyon dispensed with the need for control that figured 
prominently in the Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Burlington Northern.167 
This conclusion appears to ignore the fact that Vulcan sold to an 
intermediary.
168
 This obscured fact also impacts the application of the 
useful-product doctrine. If Vulcan had sold to an intermediary that in 
turn sold to a dry cleaner that Vulcan had no knowledge of, contact with, 
or control over, the remoteness of Vulcan from the ultimate site of 
disposal should have triggered the useful-product doctrine as described 
in Burlington Northern. Finally, the district court found that the other 
touchstone of arranger liability—ownership—was satisfied because at 
one time Vulcan owned the product.
169
 The district court failed to 
distinguish the facts in Burlington Northern, namely that Shell owned the 
chemicals at the time the transaction was entered into. 
The sum total of the court‟s ruling on Lyon can be interpreted as 
 
 
161
 Id. at *16. 
 
162
 Id. at .*19-20. 
 
163
 Meline MacCurdy, “Useful Product” Exception Rejected and CERCLA Claim Against 
Chemical Manufacturer Is Allowed To Proceed, MARTEN L. GROUP ENVTL. NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008, 
www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20080123-cercla-exception-rejected. 
 
164
 Id. 
 
165
 Lyon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329, at *6. 
 
166
 United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 809 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“Shell arranged for delivery of the substances to the site by its subcontractors; was aware of, and to 
some degree dictated, the transfer arrangements; knew that some leakage was likely in the transfer 
process; and provided advice and supervision concerning safe transfer and storage. Disposal of a 
hazardous substance was thus a necessary part of the sale and delivery process.”). 
 
167
 See id. at 809-10. 
 
168
 See Lyon, 2007 U.S. Dist., at LEXIS *6. 
 
169
 Id. at *18-.19. 
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creating a quasi-products-CERCLA liability scheme, undermining the 
useful-product doctrine and ensnaring a chemical manufacturer that had 
no contact with the ultimate purchaser in costly CERCLA litigation.
170
 
Notably, the intersection of “foreseeability” intertwined with pure 
manufacturer liability sounds in traditional products liability. It could be 
argued that differences between Burlington Northern and Lyon suggest 
that the district court‟s result is an aberration or simply the result of 
Burlington Northern applied under a more generous motion-to-dismiss 
standard. But the Lyon decision may also reflect a Ninth Circuit trend to 
impose liability on parties relating to dry-cleaning facilities.
171
 The 
decision does suggest a broader reach of arranger liability based on the 
underpinnings of Burlington Northern.
172
 
The result in Lyon should be distinguished from City of Merced v. 
R.A. Fields
173
 and California Department of Toxic Substances Control v. 
Payless Cleaners.
174
 All three cases presented similar facts, similar 
claims of arranger liability, and similar outcomes for the defendants.
175
 
The difference lies in the measuring stick by which the district court 
assessed arranger liability and facts or lack of facts material to the useful-
product doctrine. 
In City of Merced the court appeared willing to exonerate a 
manufacturer who “does nothing more than sell a useful, albeit 
hazardous product” as measured by analysis seen in Cadillac 
Fairview.
176
 In City of Merced a third-party action was initiated against a 
manufacturer of dry-cleaning chemicals.
177
 The gravamen of the third-
party claim was arranger liability attaching to the manufacturer.
178
 
 
 
170
 This is an observation that is shared by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 
The American Chemistry Council, and the American Petroleum Institute, as evidenced in their 
amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court prior to the Court considering the Ninth Circuit‟s 
ruling in Burlington Northern. See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. as 
Amici Curiae, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (Nos. 07-1601, 07-1607), 2008 WL 6059064, 2008 WL 
5026653 at 17-18. 
 
171
 MacCurdy, supra note 162; see also Brad Marten, Dry Cleaning Franchisor Tagged with 
Cleanup Costs, MARTEN L. GROUP ENVTL. NEWS, Nov. 2, 2005, www.martenlaw.com/news/?20 
051102-dry-cleaning-cleanup. 
 
172
 MacCurdy, supra note 162. 
 
173
 City of Merced v. R.A. Fields, 997 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Cal. 1998). 
 
174
 Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (E.D. 
Cal. 2005). 
 
175
 See supra text accompanying notes 143-52 and infra text accompanying notes 176-85. 
 
176
 City of Merced, 997 F. Supp. at 1332. 
 
177
 Id. at 1329-30 (including defendant Vulcan Materials Company, the same movant in 
Lyon). 
 
178
 Id. at 1331-32; see also Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. 
Supp. 2d 1069, 1076-81 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 
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However, the court indicated that it simply did not have sufficient facts 
to find for the defendant in light of the plaintiff‟s allegations that the 
transaction went beyond supplying the chemical in question.
179
 Lyon can 
be distinguished from City of Merced. The district court in Lyon accepted 
that the defendant had no contact with the third-party plaintiff, that the 
defendant was not aware that the third-party plaintiff had purchased the 
defendant‟s product, and that there was no subsequent authority or 
control of third-party plaintiff‟s disposal.180 Employing facts similar to 
Lyon, a logical conclusion could be drawn that the court in City of 
Merced could have found for third-party defendants.  Such a result would 
be contrary to the result in Lyon. 
In Payless Cleaners, the court denied the third-party defendant‟s 
motion for summary judgment on arranger liability not because the 
manufacturer, the third-party defendant, sold a product, but because of 
the manufacturer‟s alleged control over the installation process that led to 
disposal.
181
 The third-party plaintiffs had alleged that the third-party 
defendant was a manufacturer of dry-cleaning equipment and the 
successor of a franchisor for a dry-cleaning operation.
182
 Further, the 
third-party plaintiff alleged that the third-party defendant designed, 
manufactured, and installed dry-cleaning machines.
183
 The district court 
stated that allegations of a product sale did not support a finding for an 
arrangement for disposal because the transaction could be described 
“only as the sale of a useful good which, through its normal use, created 
a waste byproduct.”184 The court denied the motion for summary 
judgment however, based on allegations that the product manufacturer, 
in its role as franchisor, chose the location of waste discharge points at 
the facility in question in addition to physically installing machines and 
connecting machines to the discharge points.
185
 Lyon lacked the 
additional allegations found in Payless Cleaners that the product 
manufacturer physically installed and chose the waste discharge 
points.
186
 A strong argument exists that absent the additional facts in 
Payless Cleaners, beyond the sale of the product, the district court would 
have granted the third-party defendant‟s motion for summary judgment, 
 
 
179
 City of Merced, 997 F. Supp. at 1332. 
 
180
 United States v. Lyon, N. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329, at *6. 
 
181
 Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1078-
80 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 
 
182
 Id. at 1076. 
 
183
 Id. 
 
184
 Id. at 1078. 
 
185
 Id. at 1080. 
 
186
 See id. 
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an outcome different than Lyon. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES ARRANGER LIABILITY: 
BURLINGTON NORTHERN’S APPEAL FROM THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
The Supreme Court considered Shell‟s appeal from the Ninth 
Circuit‟s decision imposing arranger liability in Burlington Northern.187 
In its brief discussion of arranger liability, the Court quickly undid much 
of the Ninth Circuit‟s decision and significantly curtailed the future 
application of a broader arranger liability.
188
 The Court eschewed the 
notion of control or foreseeability under a broader arranger liability 
theory and instead required a definitive finding of intent.
189
 In so doing, 
the Court set the stage for highly intensive fact-finding inquiries in order 
to determine arranger liability status.
190
 The Court also impliedly 
reaffirmed the useful-product doctrine.
191
 
In defining transactions that might trigger arranger liability, the 
Court drew two bookends. At one end, the Court placed clear-cut cases 
of direct or traditional arranger liability, and at the other, transactions 
that would invoke the useful-product doctrine.
192
 Shell‟s transaction with 
B&B was somewhere within this spectrum.
193
 
[I]f an entity were to enter into a transaction for the sole purpose of 
discarding a used and no longer useful hazardous substance[, liability 
would attach under § 9607(a)(3)]. It is similarly clear that an entity 
could not be held liable as an arranger merely for selling a new and 
useful product if the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst 
to the seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to 
contamination. Less clear is the liability attaching to the many 
permutations of “arrangements” that fall between these two 
extremes—cases in which the seller has some knowledge of the 
buyers‟ planned disposal or whose motives for the “sale” of a 
 
 
187
 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878 (2009). 
 
188
 See id. at 1880. 
 
189
 Id. 
 
190
 See id. at 1879 ( “There is no bright line between a sale and a disposal under CERCLA. A 
party‟s responsibility . . . must by necessity turn on a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the 
transaction.”) (quoting Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R. Co., 142 F.3d 
769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 
191
 See id. at 1878-79. 
 
192
 See id. 
 
193
 See id. 
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hazardous substance are less than clear.
194
 
The Court observed that lower courts, to define liability within this 
continuum, have often conducted fact-intensive inquiries beyond the 
parties‟ characterization of the transaction as a disposal or a sale to 
discern if the arrangement was one Congress intended to fall under 
CERCLA.
195
 The Court agreed with that analysis but stated that the 
inquiry ends within the limits of the statute.
196
 Looking to the plain 
language of the statute, the Court stated that to “arrange” implies action 
directed to a specific purpose, and therefore to “arrange” under § 
9607(a)(3), an entity must take intentional steps to dispose of a 
hazardous substance.
197
 
Describing Shell‟s practices, the Supreme Court stated that 
knowledge of leakage or spilling is insufficient to hold a party 
responsible for having planned a disposal.
 198 
 Accordingly, to be liable 
under the Act, Shell would have to have entered into the transaction with 
the intention that at least some of the D-D be disposed of by one or more 
of the methods described in § 6903(3); the Court observed that the 
evidence before the district court did not establish this.
199
 This 
conclusion is notable for two reasons. First, the Court‟s conclusion 
forecloses the Ninth Circuit‟s holding that arranger liability may be 
founded upon any transaction that includes disposal as a foreseeable 
byproduct.
200
 Second, the Court seemed at odds with the Ninth Circuit‟s 
view on the effect of the district court‟s findings. The Supreme Court 
concluded that Shell‟s knowledge of continuing spills and leaks and 
unsuccessful efforts to stem these problems were insufficient to support a 
finding that Shell had arranged for the disposal of D-D and therefore 
liable under § 9607(a)(3).
201
 
What the Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington Northern makes 
clear is that arranger liability will attach only when an entity deliberately 
plans for disposal of an unused and useful product.
202
 A PRP‟s 
 
 
194
 Id. at 1878-79 (citations omitted). 
 
195
 Id. at 1879. 
 
196
 Id. 
 
197
 Id. at 1879-80. 
 
198
 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009). 
 
199
 Id. 
 
200
 See id. 
 
201
 Id. 
 
202
 Gregory Weimer, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States: The 
Supreme Court Provides Guidance on Arranger Liability and Apportionment, 35 VT. BAR J. 46, 47 
(2009). 
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knowledge of leaking and spillage may be used in the determination of 
intent but is not entirely dispositive of the issue.
203
 Thus, sales of new 
and useful products will likely not be held to be arrangements for 
disposal.
204
 
What the decision does not clear up, however, is how much 
knowledge of spillage and leakage will amount to the requisite level of 
intent to impose arranger liability.
205
 Further, it is not clear what remains 
of a broader arranger liability scheme in general. It would appear that the 
Supreme Court‟s holding would favor a results analogous to Cadillac 
Fairview and less likely to support a ruling similar to that in U.S. v. Lyon.
 
206
 The Court‟s ruling makes it more difficult to prove that a party 
involved in a new product “sales” transaction was an arranger.207 
V. THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT‟S DECISION IN THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT 
The impact of the Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington Northern 
on the Ninth Circuit‟s broader arranger liability scheme can be assessed 
both in attempting to quantify what remains of broader liability and 
moreover, in its practical, immunizing effect on products manufacturers. 
With respect to understanding what remains of broader liability, the 
Supreme Court‟s requirement to find an “intent to arrange” for disposal 
undermines liability based on a foreseeability test. In addition, the intent 
requirement impliedly broadens the scope of the useful-product doctrine. 
On a practical level, the Supreme Court‟s decision likely immunizes 
“pure” products manufacturers from significant liability under a theory 
of arranger liability. 
In a certain respect, the arranger liability inquiry in the Ninth Circuit 
will not change after the Supreme Court‟s decision. The “useful indices” 
of ownership and control will still be useful as applied to understanding 
when an entity “takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous 
substance.”208 Added to the arsenal of useful indices will be the 
 
 
203
 Id. 
 
204
 Marc Lawrence, To Arrange or Not To Arrange: Intent Is the Question, 88-OCT MICH. B. 
J. 48, 50 (2009). 
 
205
 Brad Marten, U.S. Supreme Court Holds that Superfund Liability is Not Joint and Several 
Where A Reasonable Basis for Apportionment Exists; Court Also Narrows Arranger Liability, 
MARTEN L. GROUP ENVTL. NEWS, May 4, 2009, www.martenlaw.com/news/?20090504-superfund-
liablity. 
 
206
 See Lawrence, supra note 204, at 50. 
 
207
 Id. at 50-52. 
 
208
 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1879 (2009). 
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knowledge that an entity‟s product will be spilled or leaked.209 As stated 
in the Ninth Circuit opinions, with respect to ownership and control, and 
as stated in the Supreme Court‟s decision with respect to knowledge, 
none of these factors will necessitate a finding of liability, but they will 
instead be useful in providing evidence of the intent to dispose.
210
 
Consequently, under the Supreme Court‟s holding, the sum of the useful 
indices must now total intent to dispose instead of foreseeability. All 
these factors will be examined under an inquiry into the intent of the 
parties, to determine if a transaction is really an arrangement for 
disposal, as originally suggested in Cadillac Fairview.
211
 
The most significant aspect of the Supreme Court‟s decision 
however, may be the interplay between the requirement of intent and the 
useful-product doctrine, and the resultant gap in CERCLA liability that is 
created. To reiterate, the useful-product doctrine immunizes 
manufacturers, under a theory of arranger liability, “for selling a useful 
product containing or generating hazardous substances that later were 
disposed of.”212 The Supreme Court arguably upheld this principle 
without mentioning it by name.
213
 The “intent to dispose” requirement 
arguably eliminated liability for a manufacturer once its product is 
transferred to a common carrier. Recall that the issue in Burlington 
Northern was a “disposal” that took place after the product left the hands 
of the manufacturer but before the product was put to its intended use.
214
 
The process of D-D transfer, however, was one largely orchestrated by 
Shell.
215
 As stated by the Ninth Circuit, “Shell‟s liability derives not from 
its role as a manufacturer of a useful product but rather from its role in 
leakage prior to use.”216 Without broad arranger liability, CERCLA 
liability does not attach to Shell for its role in the transfer of the product. 
The Supreme Court, in ruling as it did, created a liability shield for 
products shipped by common carrier, notwithstanding any subsequent 
 
 
209
 Id. at 1880. However, “knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity „planned for‟ 
the disposal, particularly when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the legitimate sale of an 
unused, useful product.” Id. 
 
210
 Id. 
 
211
 See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
212
 United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 949 (9th Cir. 2008), 
rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (italics in original). 
 
213
 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878-9 (2009). 
 
214
 See Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 950. 
 
215
 That Shell “orchestrated” the transfer of D-D may be matter of dispute. See id. at 931 n.5 
(citing to the district court‟s findings that Shell controlled the transfer process). But see Burlington 
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009) (describing Shell‟s knowledge 
of the transfer process and even steps to mitigate loss of product). 
 
216
 Burlington N., 520 F.3d at 950 n.34. 
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“gray area”217 involvement such as Shell‟s. As stated by Judge Richard 
Posner of the Seventh Circuit, describing unintentional disposal under 
CERCLA, “in the context of the shipper who is arranging for the 
transportation of a product, „disposal‟ excludes accidental spillage 
because you do not arrange for an accident except in the Æsopian sense 
illustrated by the staged accident.” 218 The distinction between the 
liability for the manufacturer and transporter, Judge Posner explained, is 
that  
when the [manufacturer] shipper is not trying to arrange for the 
disposal of hazardous wastes, but is arranging for the delivery of a 
useful product, he is not a responsible person within the meaning of 
the statute and if a mishap occurs en route his liability is governed by 
other legal doctrines.
219
 
Thus, CERCLA liability does not attach to Shell‟s role in 
influencing the delivery of its product.
220
 A different outcome may have 
been likely if Shell had transported using its own fleet
221
 or if the 
Supreme Court had found that Shell‟s involvement went beyond mere 
knowledge of leaks, spills and unsuccessful efforts to curtail spillage 
from the transfer process it required.
222
 Requiring intent to dispose and 
dispatching a test based on foreseeability, the Supreme Court has largely 
eliminated the CERCLA “gap coverage” provided by a theory of broader 
arranger liability. 
The practical impact of the Supreme Court‟s holding in the Ninth 
Circuit is best seen in its juxtaposition with the Ninth Circuit‟s approach 
in Lyon, which represented the climax of the Ninth Circuit‟s embrace of 
a broader arranger liability.
223
 At one end of the spectrum, after Lyon, 
smaller PRPs saw a potential avenue for relief against the oppressive 
costs of site cleanup by attaching liability to most any product 
manufacturer whose product may have ended up in a disposal stream. 
After the Supreme Court‟s decision, this option has largely withered 
away. Conversely, chemical and products manufacturers, and their 
insurance carriers, were relieved after the Supreme Court‟s opinion in 
 
 
217
 See supra note 127 and notes 200-01 and accompanying text. 
 
218
 Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
219
 Id. 
 
220
 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009). 
 
221
 See Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751. 
 
222
 See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880. 
 
223
 See United States v. Lyon, N. CV F 07-0491 LJO GSA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329, at 
*16. 
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Burlington Northern, the prospect of a products-based CERCLA liability 
having been diminished. The basis of these emotions, small PRPs‟ gloom 
and manufacturers‟ relief, are easily illustrated. 
Using facts analogous to Lyon, City of Merced and Payless 
Cleaners, San Francisco dry cleaners provide a quick snapshot of the 
impact of the Supreme Court‟s decision. In San Francisco, there are 
approximately 360 dry cleaners.
224
 Of those, almost twenty percent use 
PERC.
225
 PERC is the same chemical at issue in Lyon,
226
 Payless 
Cleaners,
227
 and City of Merced.
228
 Historically, a majority of dry 
cleaners have discharged PCE through sewer laterals, one of two primary 
routes for disposal.
229
 Down-drain disposal of PCE and resultant 
sewerage leakage was the cause of contamination in Payless Cleaners 
and has been observed in other dry-cleaning cases.
230
 Arguably, based on 
the aforementioned numbers and a Lyon-type holding, product 
manufacturers face the specter of liability at over seventy sites in San 
Francisco alone for having done nothing more than having sold their 
product. This does not take into account historic sites that may not 
currently house dry-cleaning operations and sites that may have switched 
from PERC to alternative cleaning methods. Subsequent to the Supreme 
Court‟s holding in Burlington Northern, absent additional factors, these 
same manufacturers of PERC or other dry-cleaning products are likely to 
be exempt from liability. 
Neither Lyon nor the Ninth Circuit‟s holding in Burlington Northern 
stated that every CERCLA contribution action against a product 
manufacturer would ultimately be successful under an arranger theory. 
They did indicate that the issue was not going to be resolved on a motion 
 
 
224
 Marisa Lagos, S.F. Takes Green Issue to Dry Cleaners, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 19, 2009, at A-
1, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-09-19/news/17206825_1_dry-cleaners-chemical-
businesses. 
 
225
 Id. 
 
226
 Lyon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *4. 
 
227
 Cal. Dep‟t of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074 
(E.D. Cal. 2005). 
 
228
 City of Merced v. R.A. Fields, 997 F. Supp. 1326, 1329 (E.D. Cal. 1998). 
 
229
 State Coalition for Remediation of Drycleaners, A Chronology of Historical Developments 
in Dry Cleaning (Nov. 2007), available at www.drycleancoalition.org/download/drycleaning-
historical_developments.pdf.  A 1998 survey by the International Fabricare Institute, revealed that 
70% of the 900 respondents queried indicated that they discharged waste water from dry cleaning 
equipment into sewer laterals or septic tanks. Id. 
 
230
 Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. A common allegation in California dry-
cleaning litigation is that PERC is discharged during dry-cleaning operations into municipal sewer 
systems, which in turn leak or otherwise discharge the PERC. See, e.g., City of Modesto 
Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d, 865, 867-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
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for dismissal.
231
 The consequence of a holding similar to Lyon was also 
to require a manufacturing defendant to be subjected to additional 
litigation costs. The prospect of prolonged discovery may have resulted 
in more cost-of-defense settlement providing additional monies to 
address response costs. Further, while it was unlikely that equipment or 
chemical manufacturers would roll over by virtue of a ruling such as 
Lyon, the specter of strict and joint and several liability could have 
become an important bargain chip at the settlement table. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The fate of a broader arranger liability in the Ninth Circuit is 
uncertain after the Supreme Court‟s reversal in Burlington Northern.  
Expansion of arranger liability after is unlikely, however, especially in a 
situation where a defendant may invoke the useful-product doctrine
232
 or 
the hazardous substance in question was shipped via common carrier.
233
 
The Ninth Circuit‟s holding in Burlington Northern and the premise in 
Lyon that CERCLA liability may attach to products manufacturers via 
foreseeability is no longer good law. A court within the Ninth Circuit 
will likely revert to the analysis suggested in Cadillac Fairview, 
inquiring into the nature of a transaction, including looking beyond the 
defendants‟ characterization of the transaction.234 Such a court will look 
to find intent or deliberate steps toward disposal in order to impose 
arranger liability.
235
 The necessity of intent all but eliminates CERCLA 
liability for products manufacturers as envisioned by the Ninth Circuit‟s 
holding in Burlington Northern and the district court in Lyon. 
VII. AFTERWARD 
In early 2010, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of California would become one of the first courts within the 
Ninth Circuit to tackle the scope of broader arranger liability subsequent 
to the Supreme Court‟s ruling in Burlington Northern.236 In Hinds 
 
 
231
 Lyon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329, at *16. 
 
232
 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878-79 (2009). 
 
233
 See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
234
 Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565-6th66 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(quoting Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 696 (9th Cir. 1992)) 
(citations omitted). 
 
235
 See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879. 
 
236
 See Adam Orford, District Court Applies BNSF Arranger Liability Test, Dismisses 
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Investment v. Team Enterprises
237
 the district court would address facts 
and circumstances similar to those in Lyon,
238
 City of Merced,
239
 and 
Payless Cleaners.
240
 The outcome, however, would be very different.
241
 
The court concluded that as a matter of law plaintiffs‟ allegations against 
dry cleaning equipment manufacturers were not sufficient support a 
finding of arranger liability and the claims were dismissed.
242
 
The general allegations in Hinds
243
 are familiar ones. The plaintiffs 
were owners of property where the defendant, Team Enterprises, had 
operated a dry cleaning business.
244
 The plaintiffs‟ sought response costs 
incurred responding to PCE contamination at the site.
245
 It was alleged 
that defendant Kirrberg/Multmatic (Kirrberg) was liable as an arranger 
under CERCLA for having manufactured, assembled, installed, 
maintained, repaired, and/or sold dry cleaning machinery used at the 
site.
246
 Plaintiffs also alleged that Kirrberg provided instructions and 
information regarding the handling and disposal of waste waters 
 
CERCLA Claim Against Dry Cleaning Machine Manufacturers, MARTEN L. GROUP ENVTL. NEWS, 
Apr. 1, 2010, www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20100401-bnsf-arranger-liability-test. 
 
237
 The district court would issue three separate orders between January 15, 2010 and March 
12, 2010: Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 289116 
(E.D. Cal. 2010) (entitled Order on Cooper Industries, LLC‟s F.R.Civ.P. 12 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 
43)); Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 796844 (E.D. 
Cal. 2010) (entitled Order on R.R. Street & Co. Inc.‟s F.R.Civ.P 12 Motion to Dismiss Second 
Amended Complaint (Doc. 76.)); Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO 
GSA, 2010 WL 922416 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (entitled Order on Kirrberg/Multimatic‟s F.R.Civ.P. 12 
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 78.)). 
 
238
 See supra text accompanying notes 142-51. 
 
239
 See supra text accompanying notes 176-80. 
 
240
 See supra text accompanying notes 181-84. 
 
241
 See Hinds, 2010 WL 289116, at *5, *7-8, *10; Hinds, 2010 WL 796844, at *7-8, *16; 
Hinds, 2010 WL 922416, at *6, *8, *16. 
 
242
 Hinds, 2010 WL 289116, at *10; Hinds, 2010 WL 796844, at *16; Hinds, 2010 WL 
922416, at *16. 
 
243
 See Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 
796844 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 
2010 WL 922416 (E.D. Cal. 2010).  The district court‟s ruling on these to motions are substantially 
similar. The district court‟s ruling on the Cooper motion is distinguishable both on the grounds that 
Cooper was a third-party defendant, allegations against Cooper included franchisor liability and that 
plaintiff and that the district offered a more robust discussion of “intent to dispose” based on 
arguments raised by plaintiff Hinds in response to motions by R.R. Street and Kirrberg/Multimatic. 
Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 289116 (E.D. Cal. 
2010), at *1-2, *4-5; see Hinds, 2010 WL 796844, at *6-7; Hinds, 2010 WL 922416, at *5-6.  On 
account of the relative similarity and for purposes of brevity and clarity, the remaining analysis will 
only focus on the Kirrberg/Multimatic order. 
 
244
 Hinds, 2010 WL 922416, at *1. 
 
245
 Id. 
 
246
 Id. 
29
Magnus: Demise of Broad Arranger Liability
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
06_MAGNUS PRINTER VERSION 5/22/2010  11:57 AM 
456 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 3 
contaminated with PCE generated by the machinery.
247
 The central thrust 
of plaintiff‟s allegations was that Kirrberg‟s manufacture and design of 
the dry cleaning equipment constituted intentional steps to dispose of 
wastes.
 248
 
The district court conceded that plaintiffs‟ allegations constituted 
the basis for knowledge of disposal but that this in itself, did not rise to 
the level of “intentional disposal of a hazardous substance.”249 The court 
stated, “[Kirrberg] at best knew that Multimatic machine . . . „performed 
a separate and distinct function of waste disposal of used PCE . . .‟”250 
However, citing the Supreme Court‟s decision in Burlington Northern, 
the district court stated that knowledge of disposal is insufficient to prove 
intentional disposal.
251
 
The juxtaposition of “knowledge” with ownership and control were 
also important considerations for the court.
252
 Clarifying plaintiffs‟ 
authority, the court stated that “[w]e believe that ownership or 
possession, knowledge and control are the most critical factors in this 
[arranger liability analysis . . . .”253 In citing the factors involved in the 
arranger liability analysis, the district court stressed the importance, and 
plaintiff‟s failure, to demonstrate the ownership factor necessary to find 
arranger liability; the PCE must have been owned by the operators of the 
machinery.
254
 
Addressing the useful-product doctrine, the court stated that the 
plaintiff‟s allegations did not suggest that the machinery at issue was 
either a hazardous substances or a transaction for disposal of such.
255
 The 
court‟s analysis, citing heavily from Payless Cleaners, affirmed that the 
useful-product doctrine, where the transaction involves the sale of a 
useful good, remains undisturbed.
256
 
 
 
247
 Id. 
 
248
 Id. at *5; see also Orford, supra, note 236. 
 
249
 Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 922416 at 
*6 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
 
250
 Id. 
 
251
 See id. (“[Kirrberger] raise a valid point that „knowledge of likely disposal‟ does not 
impose arranger liability given that „knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity „planned 
for‟ the disposal . . .”) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 
1880 (2009). 
 
252
 Hinds, 2010 WL 922416, at *5. 
 
253
 Id. (citing Morton International, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 678 (3rd Cir. 
2003)). It is notable that the Morton court stressed the importance of ownership or possession as 
necessary requirement to arranger liability. Id. 
 
254
 Hinds Investments v. Team Enterprises, No. CV F 07-0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 922416 at 
*6 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
 
255
 Id. at *8. 
 
256
 Id. (“Plaintiffs offer nothing substantial to negate the useful product defense . . . The 
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If Hinds is a harbinger of arranger liability within the Ninth Circuit 
a few conclusions may be drawn.  First, three factors will be weighed 
heavily to find an intent to dispose and a subsequent finding of arranger 
liability: knowledge, control, and ownership or possession.
257
 Second, 
pleadings will require specificity sufficient to divine more than one of 
these factors.
258
 Last, a manufacturer of equipment, who does nothing 
more than sell a product, is likely immune from arranger liability under a 
theory that design does not equate intent to dispose in addition to 
possessing immunity under the useful product doctrine.
259
 
JON-ERIK W. MAGNUS

 
 
 
[second amended complaint] does not allege that the Multimatic machine itself is a hazardous 
substance and, in turn, that its sale is an arrangement to dispose of hazardous substances.”). 
 
257
 Id. at *5-6; see also supra text accompanying notes 208-11. 
 
258
 See supra text accompanying notes 245-49; see also Orford, supra note 236. 
 
259
 Hinds, 2010 WL 922416, at *5-6, *7-8; see also supra text accompanying notes 231; 
Orford, supra, note 236. 
Golden Gate University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2011. The author would like to thank his 
editors, Shanna Foley and Kalla R. Hirschbein and his faculty advisors Edward Baskauskas and Paul 
Stanton Kibel for their insight and support bringing this article to fruition. 
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